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''Fairly Well Known and
Need Not be Discussed''
Colonel A. F. Duguid and the
Canadian Official History
of the First World War
Wes Gustavson
n 1938, Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid
published the first and only volume of his
Canadian official history of the First World War.
It was eagerly anticipated as the Historical
Section had been directed to compile such a
history in 1921, and many veterans as well as
the public were puzzled by the delay in
publication. Despite this, however, reviewers
were generally satisfied with the results. Writing
in the Legionary, W.W. Murray declared it "a
masterly work of great care and precision," while
W.B. Kerr believed that it would form the basis
for all future works on the subject. 1 It was hoped
that the positive response would hasten
completion of the remaining seven volumes; but
nine years later and with seemingly little
progress made, the project was cancelled.

I

Although the initial reaction was favourable,
it would not prove to be lasting. Today, Duguid's
history is often overlooked for Colonel G.W.L.
Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force,
1914-1919 (1962), a one volume history of the
entire war. Duguid is generally thought of- when
thought of at all- as apathetic, unqualified, and
through his failure, having deprived Canadians
a record of an important episode in their history. 2
Having "missed the boat" as one critic put it,
Duguid and his work have subsequently been
consigned to the background of Canadian
military history, the positive reviews having been
long since forgotten. :1 Thus, there have been few
attempts to fully explain why the official history

was never completed, historians, instead,
preferring to lament its absence and generally
point to Duguid's alleged shortcomings as an
explanation.
What little commentary there is has been
brief, focusing primarily on two main points.
First, that the Historical Section was given more
duties than it could practically carry out. In
addition to compiling the official history, the
Section was charged with the collection and
classification of military documents, the
publication of historical material relating to the
military history of Canada, rendering assistance
to the British official historian, the Imperial War
Graves Commission and private historians. 4
Secondly, that production was hampered by the
lack of professional historians, with the Section's
staff being composed of a mixture of civilian
employees and serving army personnel, most of
whom had no specialized historical training.
Indeed, the presence of professional historians
is widely viewed as instrumental in the later
success of Canadian official histories. In the
words on one former head of the Directorate of
History, it has "made the difference between the
quality and quantity of official history after the
First and Second World Wars." 5
Related to the latter point is the extent to
which Duguid is personally to blame for the
failure of the project. HistorianA.M.J. Hyatt has
sympathetically argued that Duguid and his staff
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Colonel A. F. Duguid, Director, Historical Section, Dept.
of National Defence. Ottawa, Ont., 19 May 1943.

"struggled conscientiously with an enormous
task for which they had little training and could
rarely devote their full time," implying that
Duguid was overwhelmed by a situation beyond
his abilities or control. 6 In contrast, Duguid's
most strident critic was Colonel Charles P.
Stacey, who assumed Duguid's position as
Director of the Historical Section in 1945. Stacey
initially gave Duguid's work a positive review and
even referred to it as "one of the soundest pieces
of historical work ever produced in Canada." 7
Stacey's opinion of Duguid worsened as time
passed, however, and the depiction in Stacey's
memoir is hardly complimentary, with the early
drafts even less so. Privately, Stacey was even
harsher in his criticism, maintaining that Duguid
was more interested in heraldry than history,
was unqualified as an historian, official or
otherwise, and that his failed efforts had proven
to be an "expensive fiasco" and "a millstone
around my neck for years. "8 Conversely, a recent
examination concludes that while poor staff
choices were made, the real culprit was the
'malaise militaire' that gripped Canada
immediately following the Great War. 9

shortcomings, historians have ignored or
overlooked several other important factors
contributing to the Section's failure. In fact, the
Historical Section's problems can best be
understood not as the result of incompetence,
indifference and overwork, but instead as a
management failure. Put simply, the failure was
the result of several factors: government neglect
and military indifference, when combined with
Duguid's particular and painstaking
methodology and his inability to effectively
manage and prioritize the duties of the Historical
Section, resulted in an unfocused effort and
ultimately forced the end of the project.

Yet these conclusions, however persuasive,
lack depth; moreover, by focusing on Duguid's

Intent on pursuing a military career he
successfully passed the British Army entrance

*****
1\ rcher Fortescue Duguid (Scotty or Forty to
r1his friends) was born at Boutrie House,
Arberdeenshire, Scotland on 31 August 1887 to
Peter and Isabel Barclay Duguid. He attended
Aberdeen Grammar School and in 1901 entered
Fettes College in Edinburgh. In 1906 he traveled
to Canada in order to attend McGill University
and study engineering, graduating in 1912. 10
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examinations in 1910 and was given a temporary
commission in the Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery for the purpose of qualifying for a
commission in the Imperial Army. However, his
military ambitions were temporarily set aside
in favour of employment with Grand Trunk
Pacific and the Montreal Tunnel and Terminal
Company. Only in June 1914 did he resume his
military service by accepting a commission in
the 39th Outremont Field Battery. 11
Like so many other Canadians in 1914, he
promptly enlisted when war was declared and
went on to a varied and distinguished career in
the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). He
traveled to England with the First Canadian
Contingent on the staff of the 2nd Brigade
Canadian Field Artillery and landed in France
with 1st Canadian Division in February 1915.
After participating in the battles of Second Ypres,
Festubert, and Givenchy, he was invalided sick
to England. Following his recovery, Duguid was
promoted Captain and posted to the 23rd
Howitzer Battery and served with this unit
through the 1916 battles of St. Eloi, Mount
Sorrel, and the Somme. 12 Shortly before the
battle ofVimy Ridge he was again promoted and
assigned to 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery
as Brigade Major. In June 1917 he was wounded
but remained on duty and was present for
operations at Hill 70 and Passchendaele. Duguid
was then posted to the headquarters of 3rd
Canadian Division as GSO 2 in April 1918 and
served as a staff officer until the armistice.
During the war he was twice mentioned in
dispatches and was awarded the Distinguished
Service Order in June 1918. 13 By all accounts,
his was a successful and capable war service
record.
In June 1919 Duguid was assigned to
Canadian Corps Headquarters in England for
medical reasons and began duty with the
Canadian War Narrative Section (CWNS). The
CWNS was an historical organization established
in late 1918 by an agreement between Sir Arthur
Currie and the Overseas Ministry. Under the
command of Brigadier-General Raymond
Brutinel, GOC Canadian Machine Gun Corps,
the CWNS was to write a detailed narrative of
the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days
of 1918. 14 After helping to research and write
Currie's 1918 Report of Operations, Duguid
returned to Canada later that same year and

under the terms of Privy Council Order 1 736
was retained for the special purpose of
completing an historical account of the CEF. With
the merger of the CWNS and the His tori cal
Section in 1921, he was promoted Colonel and
made director, a position he held until the end
of the Second World War. He retired from the
army in 194 7, received an OBE a year later and
remained active, publishing a history of the
Canadian Grenadier Guards in 1965. Colonel
Duguid died on 4 January 1976 in Kingston,
Ontario; he was 88. 15

*****
erhaps the most common misconception
about Duguid is that he was incompetent
and/ or indifferent to his appointed task. when,
if anything. the opposite was the case. In fact,
Duguid was an ardent Canadian nationalist who
had very specific ideas about the purpose of an
official history and history itself. In the preface
to the official history, Duguid stated that he
hoped it would provide "a memorial to
participants, a source for historians, a manual
for soldiers. and a guide for the future." 16 It was
not an accident that providing a memorial was
foremost on his list of objectives as Duguid
believed that the war had been a "national epic"
and that accurately documenting the CEF's
exploits was "a duty to the dead and to
generations yet unborn. " 17 Key to any
understanding of Duguid is this notion that
history's primary purpose was commemoration.
As an 'old original' of the CEF, Duguid also had
a personal interest in commemorating the fallen
and ensuring that their deeds would not be
forgotten. As he explained to the Canadian
Historical Association in 1935:

P

Not the least of the functions of history is the
preservation of the tradition of self-sacrifice, and
the transmission to posterity of that precious
heritage so dearly bought in battle overseas
during the most momentous years in Canadian
history. 18

He therefore attempted to write history that he
would be understood," ... 100, 200, 1000 years
hence." This would seem to be incompatible with
telling the truth, but like his Australian
counterpart, C.E.W. Bean, Duguid saw no
contradiction between historical accuracy and
nationalist commemoration and hoped that
lessons would be learned from his account. 19
43
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Duguid was also a proponent of a much older
ideal, the militia myth. This enduring and illdefined principle which, among other things,
included a kind of Social Darwinism
emphasizing that the typical Canadian soldier
was of a breed apart from other combatants, a
volunteer toughened by the pioneer life with
which even the most urban Canadians were
somehow familiar. Canadians were, in Duguid's
eyes, "physically strong to endure, mentally alert
and independent, spiritually fearless and
confident in God's mercy as men are who daily
come into contact with the forces of nature." In
an early manuscript and in several articles,
Duguid expounded on these themes, often
mentioning the soldiers' civilian backgrounds,
singling out Canadian innovations and generally
explaining success in terms of national
character. 20
The evidence indicates that Duguid viewed
himself and the Historical Section as not only
the chroniclers of the Great War but also the
custodians of its memory. As self-appointed
memory guardian, Duguid had difficulty
concentrating solely on one task as he felt his
supervision or intervention was necessary to
ensure the accuracy of any and all information
regarding the CEF. Therefore, it was perfectly
reasonable - if not imperative - to spend time
crafting detailed answers to enquiries,
proofreading regimental histories, and closely
monitoring what the British official historian was
writin about Canadian forces in British

histories. Many of these were significant
undertakings; for instance, battle honours
research began in 1923, at one point occupied
nearly the entire staff, and was not fully
completed untill932. 21
It was this same feeling of duty or
responsibility that prompted Duguid's
involvement in the Memorial Chamber of the
Peace Tower. Duguid was initially to write only a
series of inscriptions for the project but later
submitted a plan for the entire design that was
approved and which replaced the original. With
his specialized knowledge of heraldry, Duguid
devised a complex arrangement of inscriptions,
symbols, devices and figures from the CEF and
earlier Canadian history, all intended to provoke
a sense of continuity between past and present
and to provide a memorial of national sacrifice.
This was obviously a very personal project for
Duguid and he spent a great deal of time
designing and supervising the implementation
of the over 800 separate carvings. Duguid is also
credited with proposing the idea for the Book of
Remembrance, which he claimed, was inspired
by a passage in the Book of Malachi. He also
assisted in its planning and production - a task
that was not completed until 1942. 22

The results of these endeavors were not
inconsequential; in addition to settling battle
honours and designing the Memorial Chamber,
the Section had, by 1929, sorted and indexed
135 tons of records, indexed over 7, 000
left: Examining the Book of Remembrance- Col. Duguid,
Dr. Lanctot, J.W. Flanagan, W.L. Mackenzie King,
Col. Osborne and Sylvia Bury.
Below: Design on ceiling of the Memorial Chamber.
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photographs, answered approximately 8,000
enquiries, and composed inscriptions for
numerous war memorials. In all, the Historical
Section had compiled 6,432 pages of material,
150 maps, 4,288 charts and 12,000 cards, but
no official history. 2 :3
The Historical Section's problem remained
a mandate that encouraged these extraneous
activities, as it provided a range of duties without
establishing clear priorities. The various tasks
assigned the Section have been noted in a
number of sources, but the exact terms of
reference have never been published or
examined in detail; yet, because they offer insight
into the Section's later difficulties it is worthwhile
reproducing them to better explain their
significance. Privy Council Order 1652 of 21 May
1921 empowered the Historical Section to carry
out the following functions.
(a) The collection, classification, co-ordination,
preservation and safe custody of all war diaries.
reports, official and other correspondence,
maps, plans and other documents or material
containing information and data relating to the
participation of Canada and the Canadian
Military Forces in the Great War.
(b) The compilation and publication of a
complete official history of the Recruiting.
Organization, Mobilization, Equipment and
Services of the Canadian Expeditionary Force
in Canada from the 4th August. 1914, to the
completion of demobilization and the further
records as defined in the aforesaid Order in
Councilof17thJanuary 1917(P.C. 19). 24
(c) The compilation and publication of a
complete official historical account of the
services of the Military Forces of Canada in the
Great War out of Canada. This History will be
supplemented by more detailed histories of the
work of certain technical branches of the service.
(d) The preparation and publication of
Historical monographs. as required, on special
military subjects connected with the History of
Canada.
(e) The compilation of such military historical
information and data relating to Canada as may
be required from time to time by the Historical
Section (Military Branch) of the Committee of
Imperial Defence.
([) The preparation of location ledgers for
Canadian military units serving in the Field
during the late War and the supply of necessary
data to the Imperial War Graves Commission
and the Honours and Awards Branch of the
Record Office.

(g) The supply of information from the records
in its custody to properly accredited historical
investigators and the facilitation of their
research. 25

Little fault can be found with regard to the first
task as the arrangement of records would be
necessary for an official history, but several
problems are immediately apparent in the
others. First, the decision to divide the history
into separate series for activities within and
outside of Canada was an obvious error. It would
mean, for example, that the story of the First
Contingent's experiences at Valcartier in Canada
and Salisbury Plain in England - although
interconnected - would be contained not only
in separate volumes, but also in separate series
with no guarantee of simultaneous publication.
The mistake would eventually be corrected but
its inclusion in the initial terms of reference is a
telling indication of the inexperience displayed
by the government and the Historical Section in
planning the official history. Second, the
remaining tasks - such as the preparation of
monographs - were vaguely defined, and the
scope and duration of the assistance to the
British Historical Section and private historians
was open to interpretation. Third and most
important, there was no firm prioritization of
the Section's duties. Under the order-in-council,
the preparation of location ledgers was
potentially equal in importance to the official
history. Indeed, Duguid would later claim that
the Section had been given a dual purpose:
supply "authentic information concerning the
military history of Canada" and codify that into
an official military history. 26 A final oversight was
the failure to establish target dates for the
publication of volumes or the history as a whole.
Such a plan, however tentative, would have given
the official history precedence and provided
much needed guidance to the Historical Section.
Yet, even when focused on the official history,
progress was hampered by the manner in which
Duguid approached research. Considerable time
was spent writing monographs and other
specialized accounts to be used as quick
reference guides when writing the official history.
Duguid hoped these stand-alone narratives could
be inserted into the narrative or included in an
appendices volume. As a result, a great deal of
material was prepared, some of it of high quality,
but again, no official historyY
45
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'The German Poison Belt: Colour-Effects of the Enemy's Diabolical Asphyxiating Gases near Ypres." by John De G.
Bryan, supplement to the Illustrated London News.

Perhaps because of his engineering
background, Duguid also tended to approach
history in scientific terms and felt that the:
Objecl is to find out exactly what happened:
conclusions cannot be drawn until all
information has been arranged in such a form
that il can be grasped readily and the relative
importance of events weighed. Otherwise
conclusions will be faulty and probably entirely
wrong.""

He felt that past historians had been
hampered by a lack of reliable information and
had engaged in excessive speculation. Such
supposition could be avoided, Duguid thought,
due to the sheer volume and accuracy of
documentary evidence available for the Great
War. Given the mass of documents, research was
then primarily a refinement process and an
attempt to create control points in order to
construct a broad outline into which additional
or new information could be easily inserted.
From this framework, detailed chapter and
paragraph sketches were arranged, drafts
prepared, circulated to reviewers for comment
and changes incorporated. 29 Letting individuals
and actions speak for themselves, Duguid hoped
to tell the story of his old comrades in arms, not
pass judgement.
Another important aspect of Duguid's
methodology was the incorporation of oral and
written testimony from the actual participants
into the history. Duguid believed that this was a

vital component of his account and spent
considerable time corresponding with and
interviewing surviving CEF officers. Many also
lent him their diaries and personal papers and
permitted copies to be made of relevant
information. In requesting information. Duguid
was often quick to add that he recognized the
sensitive nature of the material and would treat
it with the utmost discretion. To others like Sir
Richard Turner, former GOC of 2nd Canadian
Division, Duguid gave assurances that the
personal relations between officers would not
be discussed. Some respondents. however, had
no wish to participate in what they viewed as
useless controversies and cautioned him against
reopening old wounds. 30
Duguid recognized that every event
invariably produced numerous, often
contradictory viewpoints, and he was deeply
skeptical of many anecdotes, believing that
assumptions and beliefs were often remembered
as facts. He therefore tended to treat information
gathered in this manner critically; one might
even say too critically, as he did not consider
personal testimony as accurate or as important
as documentary evidence such as war diaries
and original messages. This was because it
"generally lacked the brilliance or historical value
of an impartial field message smeared with the
mud of a F.L.T." He also rated the recollections
of senior commanders and their staffs higher
than those of front-line soldiers, as they alone
knew the dispositions and interactions of units. 01
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This is a valid approach, but one is left with the
strong impression that Duguid, a former staff
officer, was in part responding to postwar claims
of incompetence in the higher direction of the
war. 32

that at one point the CEF required 15,000 sets
of razors (with cases) and 300,000 hand
towels. 34

However, the difficulty in compiling an
official history lies not so much in research but
in presentation, as 'truth' is a matter of
Duguid's approach to history had many
perspective, opinion, available evidence, and all
advantages; first and foremost it yielded a wealth
other manner of factors, including race, gender,
of information. One of the strengths of the
social class and other intangibles. So while
Official History is its encyclopedic nature in
Duguid was often able to determine 'what
which almost every aspect of Canada and the
actually happened,' what could be published was
CEF between August 1914 and September 1915
another matter. His stated desire to memorialize
is covered in some fashion. This painstaking factthe achievements of Canadian soldiers, but to
checking had another benefit as it allowed
also tell the complete story, were further
Duguid to uncover attempts, deliberate or
otherwise, to omit or alter evidence. In the
complications as they frequently worked at
transcribed notes of an interview with Sir
cross-purposes. For example, Desmond Morton
Richard Turner, for example,
astutely points out that with the exceptions
of Hong Kong, and Dieppe,
Duguid was able to add a
number of points that Turner
more
Canadians
had either neglected to mention
surrendered at Second
Ypres than in any other
or claimed to have no memory
of, including several angry
battle in the 20th century. 35
exchanges with LieutenantBut the notion of Canadian
General E.A.H. Alderson and
soldiers surrendering did
not accord with Duguid's
Turner's unwillingness to
withdraw the charge that 1st
ideas of Canadians as
Canadian Division had
fearless,
determined
GENEHAJ. SER.fFS V
. • OL. I. AUG. 1914 - SEPT. 1.915
neglected the :Jrct Infantry
combatants. Consequently,
COLON£I
uv
• A. FORTEscuE nucum
Brigade during Second
the number of Canadians
Ypres.:n
taken prisoner during the
battle is not included in the
Although thorough and
Official History. The only
accurate, this process was
reference to be found is one
not one that could be
line in an excerpt from the
completed quickly and
German Official History in the
appears to have been
appendices volume. Canadians
lumped in with the other
are only depicted as being
tasks - real and imagined
captured when wounded or
- of the Historical Section.
overcome by weight of numbers,
Moreover, while accuracy is a laudable goal, there
they willingly surrender. :H;
never do
is a difference between scholarly exactitude and
a descent into petty detail, a distinction that
Nor was Duguid opposed to softening
Duguid never seems to have fully comprehended.
evidence or downplaying events in favour of
He even once admitted that "getting it right" had
individuals. In a lengthy dispute over Currie's
become something of an obsession; in the
actions at Second Ypres with the British Official
process, Duguid appears to have 'missed the
Historian, Brigadier-General Sir James
forest for the trees' at times as the value of some
Edmonds, Duguid deliberately withheld
of the minutia contained in volume one and
information pointing to the probable destruction
prepared for future volumes is questionable. Is
of 1st Canadian Division's war diary as he
it truly necessary to know that the average price
distrusted Edmonds willingness to handle it with
of horses in the First Contingent was $172.45
the proper restraint. 37 Likewise, Duguid
admitted that out of consideration for Turner
and that each was inoculated with a prophylactic
streptococcus? Equally suspect is the knowledge
the whole truth of his conduct at Second Ypres,
47
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particularly his confused withdrawal to the GHQ
line on 24 April 1915, had not been told. Instead.
it was his policy to divert attention to either the
"higher command, or to the brilliant fighting of
the troops, or to a flank" when dealing with
Turner's mistakes. 38 Concealing the worst errors
of individuals was not limited to Turner or even
the official history. Duguid also altered a passage
in Ralph Hodder Williams' regimental history of
the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
in order to avoid criticism of an officer with an
otherwise fine war record, and suggested
changes to other regimental historians. At times,
however, Duguid found that his official position
made pointed criticism difficult and he once
remarked that many of his criticisms would be
too devastating to print. 39
It is wrong, though, to simply dismiss
Duguid's work as parochial and assume that he
covered up every unpleasant aspect of the war.
To his credit he refused to exclude the
controversy relating to the Ross Rifle as Turner
suggested. Some battlefield praise was added in
response to criticism, but his discussion of the
rifle's history and deficiencies is quite frank and
remains essential reading for anyone interested
in the subject.~ He also included figures
indicating a high rate of venereal disease among
Canadian troops and the problems encountered
in supplying reinforcements to existing units.
The early mismanagement of the war was
mentioned and Duguid even suggested that the
demands and consequences of modem war were
not fully comprehended in 1915. 41 Unfortunately,
Duguid's inclusion of a mass of detail, his dry
prose, and tendency to limit the text to a
straightforward and uncritical narrative, has
obscured many of his relevant points.
0

*****
f Duguid's priorities and methodology slowed
progress on the official history, some of the
responsibility for this lack of production and
focus must also lie with the army and successive
governments. As the architects of the Section's
overall structure, both were slow to react to
obvious problems. During the war the
government had been content to rely upon the
efforts of the flamboyant Sir Max Aitken (later
Lord Beaverbrook) and Dominion archivist,
Arthur Doughty, to ensure the documentation
of the Canadian war effort, waiting until just after

I

the armistice to finally establish an Historical
Section.c~" Although supportive in principal, a
series of ministers who were uninterested in the
defence portfolio meant that a coherent policy
was, in Stacey's words, "somewhat slow in
crystallizing."43 This is, in fact, a rather generous
assessment as the government's actions suggest
that there was never a clear policy of any kind.
Having created a Historical Section the
government then allowed three years to lapse
before providing it with a mandate. Even then,
there was little direction to clarify the Historical
Section's official role, with Duguid and his staff
being saddled with a number of miscellaneous
and wide-ranging duties unconnected to the
official history. Viewing the Section as a
temporary organization, the government also
ignored or turned down numerous requests by
Duguid to have his staff made permanent,
prompting several to resign or request transfers.
Not until 1940 were the civilian employees some of whom had been 'temporary' for over 17
years- finally granted permanent status. 14
Added to this general indifference was the
acrimonious atmosphere in the newly-created
Department of National Defence. Intended to
increase inter-service cooperation and reduce
administration costs in a period of
retrenchment, the department came into being
on 1 January 1923. Problems immediately arose
as the new Chief of Staff, Major-General J.H.
MacBrien, sought to subordinate the interests
of the air force and the navy to those of the army
in order to maintain the army's place as the
senior service. The Director of the Naval Service,
Commodore Walter Hose, strongly objected to
this and the ensuing feud between the two
effectively paralyzed the department until
MacBrien's resignation in June 1927. 45 This
episode was particularly damaging to the
Historical Section as it occurred at time when it
needed direction to where its efforts should be
focused. Indeed, successive ministers did not
provide this guidance, and MacBrien,
preoccupied with departmental in-fighting and
plagued with financial difficulties, could offer
infrequent assistance only.
MacBrien's resignation returned a semblance
of order to the Department and with it a renewed
interest in the Historical Section and a chance
to redress the neglect of the previous years. In
early 1928 Duguid even responded to one query

48
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PROPOSED SCHEME OF GENERAL VOLUMES
The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919 1
Volume 1
Ypres 1915
Aug 1914-Sept 1915
Outbreak of War
Raising the 1st Contingent, Valcartier
Salisbury Plain: France
YPRES. 1915
FESTUBERT
GIVENCHY

Volume 2
The Salient, 1915-1916
September 1915 -August 1916
Holding the Line
Arrival of the 2nd Cdn Div and
formation of a Corps
3rd Cdn Div- Cdn Cav Bde Mounted
ST.ELO\
MOUNT SORREL
Forestry
C.O.R.C.C.

Volume 3
The Somme 1916
Aug 1916-Jan 1917
The Somme

Arrival of the 4th Division
Battles of the SOMME
Overseas Ministry Formed
Munitions

Volume4
Vimy 1917
Jan 1917-0ct 1917

Volume 6
Amiens 1918
March 1918-Aug 1918
The German March Offensive and the
Battle of AMIENS
Reorganization of Engineers and M.G.
R.R. Troops

Volume 7
Arras- Mons, 1918
Aug 1918-Nov 1918

Trench Warfare
5th Canadian Division
VIMY

HILL 70
First Canadian Railway Troops

Volume 5
Passchendaele 191 7
Oct 191 7 - March 1918
PASSCHENDAELE and its lessons
Reorganization
Recruiting
Tunneling
Canadians in Air Services
M.S.A.
L

ARRAS

CAMBRA\
VALENCIENNES
MONS

Volume 8
Nov 1918- 1920
The Rhine -return to Canada
Siberia- Murmansk- ArchangelPalestine -Dunsterforce
Reorganization

Duguid to CGS, (Foulkes), 15 January 1946, File 2, DBF.

by predicting the publication of the first volume
in the next year, if the Section's workload was
reduced. The Defence Minister J.L. Ralston was
not so optimistic and authorized a committee
to investigate the Historical Section.
Unfortunately, settling the committee's
composition proved problematic and it took
some months before it was finally concluded.
Eventually it came to include Henry Marshall
Tory, President of the National Research Council,
as chairman, and Major-General H. C. Thacker,
Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Adam Shortt,
Chairman of the Historical Documents
Publication Board, Norman Rodgers, later
Minister of National Defence (1939-1940), and
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred Bovey, Director of
Extra-Mural Relations for McGill University,
formerly the commander of the Canadian
Section at GHQ. And in what seems a conflict of
interest, one of Duguid's assistants, Captain
Frank Cummins, acted as the Committee's
secretary. 46
The Committee finally convened for three
days in late December 1928 and issued its report
early in the New Year. Among other things, it
recommended that the history should be written
and an advisory board appointed to oversee its

production. What likely alarmed Duguid was the
Committee's view that the official history should
not emphasize military history, instead focusing
on the war's social, political and economic
impact. The strictly military aspects of war, the
Committee felt, could be dealt with in several
subsidiary volumes but should still emphasize
the war as a national struggle. Exactly what form
the history would take- one volume or a series
of volumes- the Committee did not say. There
was also no mention of a timetable for its
completion, although Bovey later explained to
the new CGS, Major-General A.G.L.
McNaughton, that they thought it would take
seven or eight years. The Committee also wished
to appoint a professional historian to the task,
relegating Duguid to the role of research
assistant. 47
Fortunately for Duguid, none of the proposed
changes went beyond the planning stages as
McNaughton questioned some of the
Committee's findings and enthusiastically
endorsed Duguid as the right man for the job. 48
McNaughton's praise may have been influenced
by the fact that he and Duguid had served
together and he (and no doubt others) must have
been uneasy at the prospect of an 'official'
49
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monograph from someone other than a serving
officer. As a result, no attempts were made to
modify the Committee's findings and in the
absence of any firm direction, very little changed
and the Historical Section continued to operate
much as it always had. Duguid even reversed
his previous recommendation that the Section's
work be reduced and for the next three years it
continued with its many duties. That is, until
McNaughton and Duguid interpreted a brief May
I932 statement by the Minister of National
Defence Donald M. Sutherland, as an official
appointment and finally got down to the business
ofwriting. 49
The publication of volume one in I938
seemed to herald a new beginning for the
Historical Section and Duguid reported that
work on the second volume was progressing
steadily. Yet the outbreak of the Second World
War sounded what would be the death knell for
both Duguid and the Great War history. Even
while urged to redouble his efforts, work on the
history was almost immediately suspended as
the demands of the current conflict inevitably
limited the time that could be devoted to
researching and writing it, despite the more than
doubling of the Historical Section's staff by
I944. 50 In many ways this was simply a
continuation of the problems of the I920s and
30s as official policy and Duguid's own priorities
prevented any meaningful work on the history.
Things appeared to turn around in I945
when Stacey was appointed Director of the
Historical Section and Duguid was given a
separate directorate with no responsibilities
other than finishing his series. There was a sense
of urgency to this move as Duguid had only about
two more years to serve before retirement and
was considered the only man capable of
completing the job. 51 The feasibility of finishing
the remaining seven volumes in two years, when
it had taken I 7 years to publish the first, appears
not to have been seriously considered. Duguid,
on the other hand, did not think it could be
concluded in two years, regarded the deadline
as a target date, and therefore devoted his time
to laying the groundwork for his successor. 52
Why the General Staff did not clarify their
position or even seem to notice what Duguid was
doing was partly due to the fact that Duguid's
establishment was now but a subsection of a
larger organization, one traditionally regarded

with some ambivalence. As well, there were the
greater and more immediate problems
associated with reorganizing the Department of
National Defence and demobilizing and
repatriating the overseas army.
Surprisingly though, the final decision to
cancel the official history was made by the army
itself. Faced with certain cuts in defence spending
in I946, the CGS, Lieut.-General Charles
Foulkes, directed his vice chief, Major-General
C.C. Mann, to investigate the plans for both the
First and Second World War Histories, the
results of which were anything but encouraging.
Mann recommended -and Foulkes concurred that Duguid's section cease operations, be
disbanded as of I January I94 7 and its records
deposited in the Public Archives of Canada. Both
had balked at the total projected cost of the
official history- over a half million dollars - at
time when the armed forces were struggling to
allocate scarce resources. Poor sales of Duguid's
and Sir Andrew Macphail's medical history were
also cited as evidence of little public interest in
any such history and provided another
compelling reason for its cancellation. 53 Foulkes
also argued that advances in warfare had
rendered any study of the First World War
unnecessary. The Great War was, in effect, old
news, and any lessons, Foulkes reasoned, could
be gleaned from existing works, even if none had
a Canadian perspective. Perhaps as W.A.B.
Douglas has suggested, with little experience in
using history for its own institutional purposes,
the Canadian military felt it could forego the
effort - and the expense. 54 Duguid's plea to
reconsider the decision proved futile and in the
ensuing budgets cuts the CEF history, along with
the burgeoning historical programs of the Royal
Canadian Navy and Air Force were eliminated
with only Stacey's army history surviving. 55

*****
fficial historians, Sir Herbert Butterfield
remarked, "get the reward that is certainly
due to them". What Butterfield meant was that
those historians with access to the "charmed
circle", as he deemed it, of government officials,
institutions and restricted documents, who fail
to resist the "soft charms ... and subtle
comfortable chains" of their position, deserve
the historical censure they so often receive. 56
Written over fifty years ago, Butterfield's
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observations about the pitfalls of official history
still resonate, but does Duguid deserve the
disdain and ignominy that many seem to feel
for him and his efforts?
It should be obvious that Duguid was a much
better historian than Stacey and others have
made him out to be. While Duguid's methodology
was idiosyncratic, his notes and drafts show a
sophistication of thought previously
unacknowledged, and a keen awareness of the
problems involved with interpreting evidence.
Despite this reevaluation, few modem historians
would agree with his views on the infallibility of
documents. Moreover, Duguid was prone to
generalize the experiences of soldiers to fit his
own nationalist ideals, which led him to either
alter evidence or place it in appendices to hide
discreditable events. Similarly, pressure exerted
on him by individuals, plus his own personal
loyalty towards senior officers, resulted in the
concealment of Currie's and Turner's worst
errors. Still, to dismiss the entirety of his work
on these grounds is to ignore his real qualities
as a historian. A close examination of the official
history reveals that much of what Duguid wrote
is still relevant and the official history arguably
remains the single best source for the early
history of the CEF. 57 In evaluating Duguid it is
also useful to remember that he was not an
academic historian or a veteran turned author
like Will Bird, who was able to freely express
his opinions, but an official historian with all
the advantages and constraints of that position. 5 8

Although the analogy can be carried too far,
the plight of the Historical Section in the 1920s
and 30s paralleled that of the army itself as both
were in need of guidance that was not
forthcoming. 59 The Historical Section's 1921
reorganization provided little direction due to
its vague terms of reference and myriad of
supplementary duties. This problem was
compounded by the general staff's
preoccupation with their own political battles
and successive ministers who did not know what
the Section was doing and had little inclination
to find out. For his part, Duguid interpreted
many of his responsibilities in the broadest
manner possible and, at times, went out of his
way to take on extra work. It would seem,
therefore, that the Historical Section's problems
were less the result of incompetence or
indifference than they were of mismanagement
at all levels.

This failure, however, was not preordained
and it must be concluded that the primary
reason for the lack of progress was Duguid's
mismanagement. A vague mandate and official
indifference may have made the job more
difficult, but these were ultimately obstacles that
could have been overcome by Duguid and his
staff. Indeed, faced with many of the same
hurdles, C.E.W. Bean produced what is regarded
as perhaps the finest First World War official
history series. 60 In the end, it is somewhat ironic
and unfortunate that Duguid's perfectionism and
obsession with preserving the memory of the
CEF actually prevented him from completing the
one project that would have had the lasting
impact he hoped for.
A recent analysis of the CEF in the latter
stages of the war concludes "neither before nor
since have Canadians played such an effective,
crucial and decisive role in land warfare. "61 Given
this and the popular sentiment that the war
proved to be Canada's 'coming of age,' Duguid's
unfinished account must surely rank as one of
the most regrettable episodes in the writing of
Canadian military history. This is all the more
telling when one considers that far from being
the final authority that some imagined, official
histories are often the first word and have tended
to heavily influence the direction of subsequent
debate. 62 One could even argue that the lack of
an official account- Nicholson notwithstanding
- is why Canadian First World War historians,
until very recently, have focused on a rather
narrow selection of topics: the heroism of
Second Ypres, the glory ofVimy, and the genius
of Currie. 63 For this state of affairs, Duguid bears
a measure of responsibility and in a very real
sense he did 'miss the boat,' although critics
would still do well to remember Stacey's
observation that "the task of an official historian
is difficult at best, and in Canada perhaps
especially so. "64
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starvation, brutality, and forced labour plagued
the existence of tens of thousands of Allied POWs in World
War II. More than a quarter of these POWs died in captivity.
Long Night's Journey into Day centres on the lives of
Canadian, British, Indian, and Hong Kong POWs captured
at Hong Kong in December 1941 and incarcerated in camps
in the Japanese Home Islands. Experiences of American
POWs in the Philippines, and British and Australians POWs
in Singapore, are interwoven throughout the book.
Starvation and diseases such as diphtheria, beriberi,
dysentery, and tuberculosis afflicted all these unfortunate
men, affecting their lives not only in the camps during the
war but after they returned home. Yet despite the dispiriting circumstances of their captivity, these men found ways
to improve their existence, keeping up their morale with
such events as musical concerts and entertainments created
entirely within the various camps.
Based largely on hundreds of interviews with former
POWs, as well as material culled from archives around the
world, Roland details the extremes the prisoners endured.
SICKNESS,

54
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss2/4

14

